Abstract. This paper reports on the first steps towards the formal verification of correctness proofs of real-life protocols in process algebra. We show that such proofs can be verified, and partly constructed, by a general purpose proof checker. The process algebra we use is ~tCRL, ACW augmented with data, which is expressive enough for the specification of real-life protocols. The proof checker we use is Coq, which is based on the Calculus of Constructions, an extension of simply typed lambda calculus. The focus is on the translation of the proof theory of #CRL and/~CRL-specifications to Coq. As a case study, we verified the Alternating Bit Protocol.
Introduction
This paper reports on the first steps towards the formal verification of correctness proofs of real-life protocols in process algebra. We show that such proofs can be verified, and partly constructed, by a general purpose proof checker. The focus is on the translation of process algebra (specifications and proof theory) to the language of the proof checker. As a case study, we verified the Alternating Bit Protocol (ABP) [BSW69] . We chose this protocol, not because there was any doubt about its correctness, but because it is small, well-known, and numerous correctness proofs are available in the literature [BaW90, BeK86b, BEG93, Dro94, Kam93] .
The process algebra that we use is based on the Algebra of Communicating
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Processes (ACP) of Bergstra and Klop [BeK86a] . More precisely, we use/~CRL, ACW augmented with data [GrP94, GrP93] , which is expressive enough for the specification of real-life protocols. The proof checker we use is Coq [DFH93] , which is based on the Calculus of Constructions, an extension of simply typed lambda calculus. The word 'verification' usually refers to a mathematical proof in a combination of natural language and formal or informal mathematical notation. Consider for example the correctness proof of the ABP given in Sections 4.7 and 5.7 of [BaW90] . It consists of a series of steps so small that the reader is convinced of the correctness of each step. Indeed, the proof in [BaW90] is more detailed than most other verifications, because the intended reader is an undergraduate student.
For centuries, this form of verification was the best there was. But, as both the writer and the reader of the proof are human, what guarantee does it give that a proof is indeed correct? After all, to err is human. In some cases, especially now that computer programs and protocols are being incorporated in vital control systems, there is so much at stake that such a verification of a program is simply not enough. Especially in concurrent systems, where the number of situations can be exponential in the number of components, it is not at all unlikely that an unfortunate conjunction of circumstances is overseen during its design, testing, and verification-by-hand.
Recently it has become possible to let a computer program take over the role of the reader, or even that of the writer of proofs. In the first case such a program is called a proof checker, in the second case a theorem prover. The Coq-system, on which we focus in this paper, is a proof checker equipped with very limited theorem proving capabilities.
In contrast to a 'classical' verification, a formal verification is a proof formulated completely in a formal language; each step in it consists of the application of a formal proof rule. Theoretically, a formal verification could be done completely by hand, but on the basis of our experience (e.g. [Kam93]) we claim that, for real-life protocols, it can only be done using a computer. Such a verification is, by the nature of computers, a formal verification. To stress these observations, and also because a great deal of human input is still needed, we avoid the phrase 'automatic verification'.
If a proof checker is convinced of the correctness of a proof, should we be convinced too? One can never hope to achieve absolutely guaranteed correctness. But we claim that formal verification can provide a significant increase in the level of confidence in a protocol. In order to support this claim, we investigate These considerations indicate that the focus of the sceptical reader must shift from proofs to axioms: a proof is the most likely place to find an error in an ordinary verification, but the proofs of a formal verification are most probably correct; for the axioms there is no such guarantee.
We hope that we have achieved a correct translation of #CRL to Coq, but the translation of a/~CRL-specification into Coq is still done by hand. We choose to stay as close as possible to the definitions of #CRL and the ABE even when this makes the proof somewhat clumsy. When we deviate from the original definitions, we do so explicitly and with motivation. If possible, we prove formally that the deviation is correct.
Formal verification is not limited to algebraic verification of protocols. In principle, it can be used for any formalism [Cou93] , for example I/O-automata [LMW94, HSV94] and temporal logic [MAP82, OWL82, Hoo91] . Earlier attempts to automatic verification of propositions of process theory are from Cleaveland and Panangaden [C1P88] , who gave an implementation of Milner's Calculus of Communicating Systems [Mil80] in the NuPrl system [CAB86] and from Engberg, Gronning and Lamport, who developed the Temporal Logic of Actions (TLA), which is a logic for specifying and reasoning about concurrent systems [EGL92] . A particularly impressive achievement is the assertional verification of wait-free linearization in [Hes94] and its formal elaboration [Hes95] . A recent approach to the ABP can be found in [Gim95] , where the behaviour of processes is modelled by streams encoded as co-inductive types of Coq. In this stage of the development of the field it is very difficult to establish the relative merit of each of the results above, since their diversity makes comparison practically impossible. However, recent experience shows that the algebraic method discussed in this paper can handle larger protocols as well [BeG94a, KOS94, GrP96] .
In the next section, we give an overview of #CRL and the ABE Then we formalize the ABP in/tCRL and sketch roughly the proof of its correctness. An introduction to Coq concludes this section. Section 3 is the core of the paper: it discusses how pCRL was translated to Coq, and which problems arose. Section 4 shows how the/~CRL-specification of a protocol is translated into Coq, taking the ABP as an example. Section 5 describes in detail how a statement reflecting the correctness of the ABP can be proved from the axioms introduced in Section 3. The proof follows the sketch given in Section 2.3. The research on the topic of this paper is only just beginning; therefore we conclude the paper with a list of directions for future research.
Preliminaries

/~CRL
#CRL is a specification formalism, combining the process algebra ACW [BaW90] with data. We give a brief and informal introduction here; for a complete description of its syntax and semantics we refer to [GrP94] , for its proof theory to [GrP93] .
Syntax and Semantics
An algebra is usually a set, together with a number of operations on that set, in principle axiomatized by an equational theory. ACW complies with this tradition. The set is a set of processes and the operations are 9 constants (called atomic actions, the set of atomic actions Act is a parameter of ACW that is often left implicit) 9 the constants 6 (deadlock) and ~ (silent action) 9 the unary operators 0L (encapsulation) and ~L (abstraction or hiding), where L is a set of atomic actions 9 the binary operators +, -, I[, I, and II, being alternative and sequential composition, merge, communication merge, and left merge. By convention, -binds strongest and + weakest
We refer to [BaW90] for an explanation of these operators. The operator I is an extension of another parameter of ACW, the communication function 7. This is a partial function which, given two atomic actions, returns an atomic action: their communication. 7 must be associative and commutative. In this paper we assume handshaking, which means that no more than two processes can engage in a single communication. Technically, it means that 7(7(a, b), c) is undefined for all actions a, b, c.
Data is specified in /~CRL by the declaration of sorts (types), functions (including constants) with their types and possibly rewrite rules (stating equalities between dataterms). The corresponding sections in a /~CRL-specification are marked by the keywords sort, rune and rew. The sort Bool containing the constants T and F is part of every/~CRL-specification. Sorts may not be empty.
/~CRL combines ACW with data through the following mechanisms.
9 An atomic action is composed of an action name and (zero or more) parameters; these parameters are dataterms. The section containing the declaration of action names (marked by the keyword act) also specifies the sorts of their parameters (overloading of action names is allowed). 9 Communication is defined on action names (in a section marked eomm). Two actions only communicate if their parameters are the same (w.r.t. the rewrite rules); the resulting action has the same parameters. Communication is used for both synchronization and transferring data in this way. 9 The conditional operator x < b ~ y takes processes x and y and a boolean b; it behaves as x if b = T and as y if b = F. 9 The sum operator ~'~d:D X denotes the (possibly infinite) alternative composition of the processes a(x) for substitutions a substituting an element of the sort D for d in x. 9 Processes can be defined by (recursive) process specifications (keyword proc).
Parameters are allowed in these definitions.
The conditional operator has a boolean as its middle argument. This is why the sort Bool is part of every #CRL-specification. The symbol '=' occurs in #CRL-specifications in rewrite rules, communication declarations, and process specifications. It is not a polymorphic function D ~ D ~ Book thus it cannot be used for forming the middle argument of a conditional operator) Moreover, it is not entirely trivial to define such a function eqD : D ~ D ~ Bool satisfying eqD(d, e) = Tiff d = e. The following specification (by Jan Bergstra) does the trick. (d,d) = T ifo (T,d,e) =d ifo (F,d,e) = e ifo (eqD(d,e) ,d,e) = e Claim 2.2. The equations in the previous example enforce
Proof of Claim 2.2. (Via the semantics of pCRL. A proof via the formal proof theory is given in the next subsection.)
2,*-*) From I, as the intended models are boolean preserving [GrP94] , that is, T @ F and for all booleans b: b = T V b = F, thus in particular
It is not without reason that an equation between processes cannot occur as the middle argument of a conditional operator: the guarded recursive process definition P = (a < P = 6 ~, 6) would lead to a~. 
M. A. Bezem, R. N. Bol and J. E Groote
Proof Theory
The proof theory of /,CRL is given in [GrP93] in a 'natural deduction' format. The formulae deduced ('/~CRL property formulae') are mostly equations, and propositional logical combinations of those. The axioms and rules can be divided into four parts: data, ACW, process constructs relating processes with data and logical connectives. Some of these depend on the #CRL-specification under consideration, most notably its declarations of rewrite rules and process definitions. For data, we have the axioms and rules listed in Table 1 . #CRL has no explicit quantification; the rule SUB enforces that each variable is implicitly universally quantified. Its application is only allowed when x does not occur in any hypothesis needed for deriving q~. For the precise definitions of substitutions and induction rules we refer to [GrP93] . An induction rule for a sort is based on a set of constructors for that sort. Which functions form a constructor set of a sort is not part of the/~CRL-specification (but see [GrW94] ). Given a/~CRL-specification, one can prove that a certain set is a constructor set only on the metalevel, using structural induction on closed terms. The axiom B1 is another reason for incorporating the booleans in every/~CRL-specification: without this axiom one can never prove the inequality of two terms (the premiss of the rule CF2' in Table 3 ).
For the logical connectives,/~CRL has a large number of inference rules. For those, we refer to [GrP93] (see also the proof below), except that we mention the rule RAA (reductio ad absurdum), stating that if falsum (• is derivable from -~q~, then q~ can be derived. As usual ~q~ abbreviates q~ --+l, thus negation and implication behave classically. But in proofs it turns out that we do not need RAA, which means that our results also hold from an intuitionistic viewpoint.
Proof of Claim 2.2. We can now prove Claim 2.2 formally in the proof theory of/~CRL. For reasons of space, we do not write the names of derivation rules to the left of the line, but below it (above it for rules without premises). -* 1, [hi denotes the rule for the introduction of an implication, where n is a pointer to the cancelled hypothesis(-es). ~E denotes implication elimination, i.e., modus ponens. q~ V ~ is introduced in/~CRL as an abbreviation of ~b -+ t/:. 
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Proofs are usually not given in such detail, for obvious reasons. For the same reasons, it is preferable that such details need not be provided to the proof checker explicitly. [] For processes, #CRL inherited the axioms A1-A7, CM1-CM9, D1-D4, T1 (called B1 in [BaW90] ) and TI1-TI4 from ACW, listed in Table 2 . All closed instances without process variables of the axioms SC1-SCS, DC1, TC1, and Handshaking are derivable. SC3 and SC4 directly reflect the properties of the communication function ~ (corresponding axioms for [I are mentioned also in [BaW90], but these are derivable). The handshaking assumption similarly results in the axiom Handshaking. SC4, CM5, CM6, and CM9 are derivable.
The axioms for the communication merge are more complicated than those of ACW, because of the presence of data. The presentation here differs slightly from [GrP93], where actions without parameters are treated as a special case. See also Section 3. The axioms for the conditional and sum operators are mostly obvious. For SUM8 and SUM9, recall that encapsulation and hiding are carried out at the level of action names. In [GrP93], SUM10 states that renaming distributes over summation; we have omitted renaming here.
The rules REFL, REPL, and SUB also apply to processes. The counterpart of FACT is called REC: p = q if p --q is a process equation. Finally, there are some more complicated inference rules inherited from ACW: RDP, RSP, and fair abstraction. These rules refer to the (recursive) specifications of processes. RDR the Recursive Definition Principle, states that such a specification has at least one solution. RSP, the Recursive Specification Principle, states that two processes are equal, if they are both solutions of the same guarded recursive specification. The Cluster Fair Abstraction Rule CFAR [BaW90] can be paraphrased informally as: 'Any process will eventually leave a r-cluster'. The details are discussed in Sections 3.5, 3.6, and 3.7.
The Alternating Bit Protocol
The Alternating Bit Protocol (ABP) is a communication protocol providing reliable transmission of data through an unreliable (two-way) channel. It consists of four components: a sender S, a receiver R, a channel K from S to R and a channel L from R to S. These components are connected according to Fig. 1 .
The numbered connection lines in Fig. 1 This fairness assumption justifies the use of the proof rule CFAR later on. The ABP roughly works as follows, S, K, R, and L run strictly synchronized, i.e., K sends a message if and only if it receives one from S, R sends a message if and only if it receives one from K, etc. (except that S sends the very first message without receiving something from L).
S reads a datum d from the input and sends a frame (eo, d) via K to R. As long as K corrupts the data, R receives frames ,1, and reacts by sending bits e~ via L to S, so that S sends the frame again. Once R receives a frame (e0, d), it writes d to the output and acknowledges this receipt by sending the bit e0 via L to S. From then on, R sends a bit e0 via L to S, each time it receives an incoming frame (e0, d) or • Process S sends a frame (e0, d) each time it receives something from L, until that something is an acknowledging bit e0. In that case S reads a new datum d' from the input and starts sending frames (ebd') to R. So now the cycle starts all over, with e0 and el exchanged. That is, R reacts to incoming frames / by sending e0, and after it receives a frame (el,d'), it writes d' to the output and starts acknowledging the receipt of frame (el, d') by sending bits et to S. It should be clear that the alternating bit is essential to distinguish new frames from old ones (note that it is not excluded that d' = d) and to distinguish the acknowledgement of a new frame from that of an old one.
The question arises: is the ABP correct? This question can only be answered after having specified a correctness criterion: the ABP should behave externally like a buffer. This raises several other questions: what is 'the ABP', what is 'a buffer' and what is 'behave externally'? These questions should be answered by giving formal specifications, instead of e.g. the rough description of the ABP above.
Specification and Verification of the ABP in/~CRL
We now present a formalization of the ABP in #CRL. It follows closely the definition of the ABP in [BaW90] , except that now data is treated more formally (which also involved some renamings). We make no difference between a bit and a boolean. Therefore we have no separate sort bit, but use Bool instead. The sort bool_Err (Frame_Err) is the disjoint sum of the sort Booi (D • Bool) and a singleton sort containing an error element, with an injection ibool : Bool---~bool_Err(iFrame :D • Bool ---~Frame_Err) . We assume D to be a given, nonempty sort; we do not specify its elements. The correctness of the ABP follows from the derivability in #CRL of ABP = Buffer. Buffer= ~d: ~3, ~, e~, i}(8{r2, s2, r3, s3, ~5, ~5, ~6, s6}(Sd ] (rs(b)" (i. s6(ibool(b) 
We now outline the correctness proof of the ABP as formalized in Section 5. For additional details we refer to Sections 4.7 and 5.7 of [BaW90] . We use H to abbreviate {r2, s2, r3, $3, r5, $5, r6, $6} and I to abbreviate {c2, c3, c5, c6, i}.
In order to exploit the symmetry in the protocol, we abstract from the state of the alternating bit in the sender and the receiver. That is, we define
It is obvious, and easy to prove by RSP, that Sd = Sd(T) and Rc = Rc(T). We also need the equally obvious equations Sd(b) = Sb(b).Sd(neg(b)) and Rc(b) = Rb(neg(b)). Rc(neg(b)).
We introduce some more auxiliary definitions. The aim of these is to give a linear description of the protocol before hiding. That is, the equations are of the In these definitions, we use the syntax (XIE) from [BaW90] to denote the process defined by the process variable X in the recursive specification E. The advantage of this notation over #CRL is that we can distinguish various (sub)systems of equations. This is particularly useful when it comes to applying RSP and CFAR formally on systems of equations, as is done in Section 5.2, respectively 5.4.
The major task of the verification is to prove the following lemma.
Proof By numerous applications of the axioms, we can infer the possible first actions of ABP_nohide(b) and their resulting states. It turns out that
Unfolding the definition of First in the lemma, and stripping the first action on both sides, we arrive at the proof obligation
The lefthandside of this equation describes the next state of the protocol. We continue by determining the possible first actions of this next state, and the state after that, and so on. After lots of steps, we derive
where SomeState is of the form Ol4(SenderStatelIReceiverStatellKStatellLState). The righthandside of this equation corresponds to the structure of El, therefore we can conclude by RSP that the aforementioned proof obligation follows from SomeState = Exitl (d, b) . Extracting first actions twice more, and unfolding the definition of Exit1, we arrive at the proof obligation SomeState ' = IXl I E2(d, b) ). This one is tackled again by RSP, and results in SomeState" = Exit2 (b). Finally, we extract the first action c6(ibool(b)) of SomeState', and arrive at
This equation Proof By unfolding First, axiom TI4, applying CFAR on the clusters El and E2, and axiom T1, we derive
Combined with Lemma 2,3, we conclude
It is now straightforward to show that ABP, being r1(ABP_nohide(T)), and Buffer both satisfy the equation
So, a final application of RSP concludes the proof. []
The Coq Proof Checker
For a complete overview of the Coq proof checker, we refer to [DFH93] . It is based on the Calculus of Constructions, an extension of simply typed lambda calculus, but a deep understanding of that formalism, in particular of the identification of propositions and types, is not necessary for understanding the use we make of Coq (propositions are of type Prop and types of type Set). One can declare types, and state the existence of (constructor) functions with their types, including constants. One can express quantification and higher order logic. The implication and negation behave constructively.
Coq extends the Calculus of Constructions by inductive definitions of sorts and
propositions. A sort is defined inductively by listing its constructors. Such a definition of an Inductive Set yields an induction principle and a Match-function, which enables the definition of (primitive recursive) functions by induction on the constructors. Together, they imply that every term of that sort is equal to a constructor term, and that all constructor terms are different. For example, the sort Bool can be translated to Coq as In fact, the notation P->Q is an abbreviation of (x:P)Q when x does not occur in Q. From the inductive definition of bool, one can prove -(<bool>true--false) (true and false are not equal) and (b:bool)<bool>b=trueV<bool>b--false (for all b of type bool, b is either true or false). These statements correspond to the axioms B1 and B2 in pCRL. One must realize that inductive definitions come with a powerful elimination principle (see below). Otherwise, one easily writes a seemingly reasonable specification which is nevertheless incorrect, perhaps even inconsistent. For this reason and others, explained later, we shall not use this translation. It would certainly not be a good idea to define processes inductively, as there is no assumption in the semantics of #CRL that all processes can be built from the given actions and operators.
By the propositions-as-types paradigm, propositions can also be defined inductively. An inductively defined type is the least set that is closed under the constructors (such that all constructor terms differ); an inductively defined proposition is the least proposition that is closed under the rules given for it. Rather than giving a formal definition, we give an example. 
R(x,y) ~ P(x,y) and R(x, y) A TC(R)(y,z) A P(y,z) --* P(x,z)
This seems somewhat stronger than the usual induction scheme without the conjunct TC(R)(y, z), but it is actually equivalent.
Also basic notions in Coq, such as truth, falsity, and equality, are inductively defined.
Inductive Definition True
: Prop = I: True Inductive Definition False : Prop = Syntax eq "< >_=_". Inductive Definition eq [k:Set;x:A] : A->Prop = refl_equal: <A>x=x I is by definition the proof of the nullary relation True; the elimination principle for True is a tautology. False is the empty nullary relation; with this definition comes the axiom False_ind: (P:Prop)False->P, the ex-falso rule, which reflects the minimality property (or the elimination principle) for False. Finally, equality on a set A is defined through the statement 'for x:A, the unary relation "being equal to x" contains only x'. This definition gives the induction principle (A:Set) (x:A) (P:A->Prop) (P x)->(a:A) (<A>x=a)->(P a). Thus the effect of eliminating z <A>b=a is that (usually all) occurrences of a are replaced by b. Equations can be used as term rewrite rules from right to left in this way. 3 Conjunction and disjunction are also inductively defined. Eliminating a conjunctive hypothesis A/\B yields two hypotheses A and B; eliminating AX/B yields two new proof obligations, one with hypothesis A and one with 13.
A proof in Coq starts from the statement that one wants to prove, which is then transformed by applying tactics. Unfold name unfolds the definition of name.
Pattern position allows the selection of redexes for term rewriting.
Auto tries to complete the proof by applying hypotheses and designated theorems.
Idtac does not change the proof obligation (sometimes useful in complicated tactics).
Complicated tactics can be constructed from the basic ones. They can succeed, fail, or run out of space. A basic tactic fails if it is not applicable. applies tactico and then tactic, ..... tactic, to the n proof obligations generated by tactico.
tries to apply tactic1, if it fails tactic2 is applied.
tries to apply tacticb but it does not fail even if tacticl does. repeats tactic1 until it fails. This tactic never fails.
Auto never fails: if it cannot complete the proof, it leaves the goal unchanged. Auto ; Exact I gives a version of Auto that can fail. (Exact I cannot be applicable after Auto, because Auto tries it.)
The Translation of #CRL into Coq
/~CRL versus Coq
/~CRL and its proof theory share a significant number of concepts with Coq; we name (data)types, equality, implication, axioms, and derivability. The most formal way to proceed is to ignore these similarities, and to encode each/~CRL-concept in Coq. That is, to define a sort muCRL_Prop of #CRL property formulae and to encode #CRL-derivability inductively as the least relation Dv : muCRL_Prop->Prop that contains all axioms and is closed under all inference rules of #CRL:
(p,q:proc) (Dv (equal proc (alt p q) (alt q p))) I ArrowI : (Phi,Psi :muCRL Prop)
In this example, equal encodes the equality predicate of #CRL, subst encodes substitution, sorts the declaration of sorts, has_sort the declaration of variables, alt the + on processes, implies implication between/~CRL property formulae, and so on.
Translating/~CRL to Coq in this way might be possible (the above formulation of ArrowI is problematic), but it is cumbersome: it gives rise to unreadable Coq texts and makes it impossible to automate the bulk of the proof (in the version 5.8.3 of Coq we used). Namely, proofs in process algebra typically use a subset of the axioms (and derived equations) as a term rewriting system, computing normal forms for process terms (modulo associativity and commutativity of +). Hand-written, such a part of the proof appears as term = term = ... = term; formally each step is an application of REPL. In the above translation, the intermediate terms cannot be found by Coq; the user must provide them. This makes it effectively impossible to find even the most trivial proof automatically. In other words, with this translation we cannot hope to achieve a granularity of Coq proofs that comes anywhere near the granularity of hand-written proofs. Consequently, this approach is not (yet) scalable to real-life protocols.
Therefore we take another approach: rather than encoding/~CRL in Coq, we embed/~CRL in Coq, that is, we map/~CRL-concepts to the 'same' concepts in Coq as much as possible. Such a translation renders Coq texts that are relatively easy to read, and intuitive proofs. The obvious problem with this approach is of course its soundness (and completeness). However, the soundness of the encoding approach is also not immediate, as it is not even proved yet that Coq is consistent [COP90, PaM93], i.e., False might be derivable. In fact, the problem lies in the inductive sets and definitions, on which the encoding relies much more than our embedding approach. Clearly, any such soundness result cannot be obtained as long as this consistency of Coq is not proved. 5
So the axioms of/tCRL are translated to axioms in Coq; inference rules (e.g. SUMll) become implications (see Section 3.4 for the details). Also the rewrite rules of a/~CRL-specification are translated to axioms, which is justified by FACT. Is the consistency of Coq in the empty state already unproven, adding axioms makes it even harder to prove consistency. One might therefore argue that a better way to proceed would be to define the proposition muCRL as the conjunction of its axioms and rules (which can be done conveniently by an inductive definition), and to use that as a premise to all lemmas and theorems. We feel that this approach does not add any confidence in the results: the question remains if this proposition muCRL entails False in Coq. From a practical point of view, the approach makes proofs much harder to read because the names of the axioms are lost.
There are some obvious mismatches between Coq and/~CRL to take care of. The most obvious mismatch occurs between the classical implication of MCRL and the constructive implication of Coq. In this case the rules of/~CRL are 5 We have been informed recently that the required result was obtained in [Wer94] for a subset of Coq that includes the techniques used in this paper.
stronger than those of Coq, so soundness is not at stake. We could have added the axiom (P:Prop)--P->P, but it turned out that we did not need it.
Another potential source of problems is equality. The equality < > --of Coq has the Leibniz property, i.e., two terms are equal if and only if they can be substituted for each other in every context of type Prop. This is a strong requirement, as these contexts are built from the expressive language of Coq. Whether = in/~CRL can be interpreted conservatively as Leibniz equality in Coq is a subject for specialized study, see [Se196] for a partial answer.
Finally,/~CRL has no explicit quantification, but instead the substitution rule. This rule entails that all variables are implicitly universally quantified. These quantifiers are made explicit in our translation. Yet not all variables in/~CRL are bound in this way: the sum operator ~d:o(x) binds the variable d of datatype D in x. We translate this binding to lambda abstraction, see Section 3.4 for the details.
Data
A significant part of the proof theory of #CRL can be translated to Coq independently of a particular MCRL-specification. Only the set of action names, the communication function ?, and the set of sorts parameterize this translation. The two sets are finite; therefore we define them as Inductive Sets 6, simply enumerating the members. These are the only Inductive Sets we use. From these definitions it is easy to prove that all actions, respectively sorts, are different (we need inequality of sorts to verify the side-condition of axiom CF2").
For simplicity, we allow actions to have precisely one data argument. For actions that have more than one parameter in the specification, pairing can be used. Actions without parameter get the dummy argument • which is the only element of the trivial sort one. Thus a translation of a pCRL-specification begins with the following definition, where the ... must be replaced by sorts specific for the specification. Why the sort nat of naturals is needed is explained in Section 3.7.
Inductive Set types = onetype:types I booltype:types I nattype:types I ...
In fact, this declaration gives us sort names. The sorts themselves are created through the declaration of a function type : types->Set.
Parameter type : types->Set.
Definition one = (type onetype). Definition bool= (type booltype). Definition nat = (type nattype).
A consequence of this approach is that we cannot define these sorts inductively. Thus we must declare the constructors and induction principles for these sorts explicitly. We can also not use the Match-function, therefore we must axiomatize the functions zero and pred, which allow us to prove that naturals of the form S"(0) differ for different n. 7 6 In Section 3.4 we explain why we cannot identify sorts from pCRL with sorts in Coq. 7 Alternatively, we could postulate a bijection between the sort nat as defined here and inductively defined naturals. Section 5.4 might be simplified by the resulting ability to use the Match-function. : (b:bool) <bool>b=true \/ <bool>b=false. Axiom nat_ind: (P:nat->Prop)(n:nat) (P O)->((y:nat)(P y)->(P (S y)))->(P n).
Parameter zero : nat->bool. Parameter pred : hat->nat.
Axiom zeroO:
<bool>(zero O )=true. Axiom zeroS: (n:nat) <bool>(zero (S n))=false. Axiom predO:
<nat> (pred 0 )=0. Axiom predS: (n:nat) <nat> (pred (S n))=n.
As we noted, #CRL has two equalities: the 'built-in' --for both data (rew) and processes (proc), and the user-defined eqD : D --* D --* Bool for each sort D. We chose not to translate eqD into Coq by literally translating the rewrite rules of Example 2.1, but by defining it by its intended meaning, namely part 1 of Claim 2.2. 
Actions and Communication
Actions in /~CRL are declared with their respective sorts, but overloading of action names is allowed: one may declare an action r with sort D and another action r with a different sort E. In the translation into Coq, actions are declared without their sorts (in other words: action names are declared). Thus there can be actions in the translation that are not present in the original specification. As these actions will not occur in the processes, this mismatch is harmless.
The comm section of a /~CRL specification, defining the communication function 7 of ACW, is translated to the function gamma in Coq. Recall that communication in #CRL is defined on action names only, that is, if two actions (of different sort) have the same name, then they must communicate in the same way. This facilitates a correct translation into Coq: gamma is specified only for the action name r, not for 'r:D' and 'r:E' separately. It is not easy to specify partial functions in Coq, therefore when ?(a, b) is undefined, its translation (gamma a b) returns the special action name delta. The process T in/~CRL behaves similarly to an atomic action, so a second special action name tau is introduced.
Thus, we expect the translation of a/~CRL-specification to provide definitions Inductive Set act = ,.. I delta:act tau:act.
Definition gamma: act->act->act = ..
gamma must have certain properties, which are stated as five proof obligations (goals) in Coq. We must prove these goals in order to show that gamma satisfies the desired properties. These properties can be used as lemmas in the correctness proof of the protocol as well. The first two properties are that delta and tau do not communicate. The third is that the communication of two actions is not r (allowing this would complicate defining guardedness, see Section 3.6). The fourth is that gamma is commutative, as is required in [BaW90]. It is also required there that gamma is associative, but we assumed handshaking, the fifth property, which is stronger. In general, the proof of these goals depends on the definition of gnmma. However, thanks to the fact that actions are defined inductively, we can use the Match-function for this definition (see Section 4 for an example). With such a definition, proving these goals becomes automatic: the literal text of the proofs need not depend on g~mma; it is always a straightforward case analysis.
Processes and Axioms
The distinction between the action a and the process a is not always obvious in process algebra. In the current setting, it is obvious that a process is formed from an action name, its sort, and an element of that sort. However, there is only one process ~5 and one process z. Thus we declare
Parameter proc
Set. Parameter ia (T:types) act->(type T)->proc.
Definition Delta = (ia onetype delta i). Definition Tan = (ia onetype tan i).
Axiom Delta_Data (T:types)(t:(type T)) <proc>Delta=(ia T delta t). Axiom Tan_Data (T:types)(t:(type T)) <proc>Tau =(ia T tan t).
It remains to model sets of actions (for hiding and encapsulation), before we declare the operators on processes. Similar to the relation R in Example 2.5, we model such sets by their characteristic function act->Prop 8. A small complication is that we have added delta and tau to the set of actions, and that these cannot be encapsulated, nor hidden. Thus we define the function goodset, which, given a set of actions, returns the same set without delta and tan. ehset->proc->proc.
8 Sellink [Se193] suggests to represent the sets for hiding and encapsulation as lists. This turns out to be unnecessary cumbersome, but raises an interesting question. Suppose that we have sets as a sort in the specification of the protocol. Then the #CRL-specification contains an algebraic specification of sets based on lists, such as the one given by Groote and Van Wamel [GrW94] (a function D ~ Bool can be declared in pCRL, but not used as a sort). Is it allowed in this case to use the characteristic function representation, or should we translate the algebraic list-based specification dutifully into Coq ? The latter is more formal, but further away from the informal specification, which requires sets. Notice that this problem does not occur for the sets of actions for encapsulation and hiding, as these sets are not sorts, but built-in syntactic objects in #CRL.
Now it is clear why we cannot identify #CRL-sorts with sorts in Coq: proc could then be used as a #CRL-sort. This would again allow the process definition P = (a < P = 6 > 6), which implies a = 6, and also ~-~x:proc x, the sum of all processes.
The #CRL term ~d:T(X) is translated to (sum T [d: (type T)]x). This
means that sum has type (T:types) ((type T)->proc)->proc. The axiom SUM2 of pCRL is now recognised as a-conversion, and can therefore be omitted in the translation. The freeness requirements of the variables in the other SUM-axioms are verified automatically: if they are not satisfied, then an unbound variable would occur. The premiss of SUM11 refers to the equality of two processes with a free variable d : D; it is translated to Vd 6 D :
Most of the axioms of #CRL translate directly into Coq, as they are simply equations between processes; variables are universally quantified. For example, A1 translates to Axiom Al:(x,y:proc)<proc>(alt x y)=(alt y x).
The derivable axioms SC4, CM5, CM6, and CM9 are not translated to axioms, but to lemmas. Some axioms have side-conditions, most notably the CF-axioms, D1, D2, TI1 and TI2. The CF-axioms have been simplified in comparison with Table 3 .
Axiom CFI : <proc> (cond (ia T (gamma a b) t) (eql T t t') Delta)= (comm (ia T a t) (ia T b t')). Axiom CF2 : -<types>T=U -> <proc> Delta=(comm (ia T a t) (ia U b u )).
CFI covers not only the case of actual communication (CF1 in Table 3 ), but also the case where communication fails because the actions do not communicate or the data is not the same (CF2 and CF2'). Claim 2.2 or the axiom def_eql justifies this formulation, which effectively replaces the premiss ~(ti = tl) of CF2' by eqr(ti, t' i) = F. The only remaining case is that of CF2": actions with different sorts (and hence incomparable data), which is covered by CF2.
Apart from the axioms listed, there are many 'derived axioms' or lemmas. These are discussed in Section 3.8.
Recursive Specifications and RDP
Informally, RDP states that a recursive specification has at least one solution. In the general case, we have a set of process variables ProcVar and a function Typ from ProcVar to types giving their associated sorts (similar to actions, we let process variables have exactly one data parameter). A solution of a system of recursive equations is now a function that interprets each process variable as a function from its data parameter to a process, thus the type of a solution (in fact, of any such interpretation) is Inttype : (X:ProeVar)(type (Typ X) ) ->proc. The system of recursive equations DefEq itself is then a process operator Inttype->Inttype (similar to G above). The solution is its fixed point. RDP states that a system of recursive equations has a solution, i.e., that a process operator has a fixed point. Thus we declare the solution function Sol: (Ingtype->Intgype)->Intgype giving a solution for each system of equations (think of it as the #-operator). That (Sol DefEq) is indeed a solution for DefEq is stated in axiom P~DP. (A Variable declaration is local within a Section; it is translated to a universal quantification outside.) Section RDP. 
(z< b ~, a). X(not(b)), then X(T) = r 9 X(F) = z. a. X(T), so we can determine the first visible action (a) of X(T) by unfolding the equation twice. Further applications of the equation give us further visible actions: the equation is guarded.
In contrast, if we have Y = a'z{a}(Y), then this equation gives us the first visible action, but a second unfolding yields Y = a. 17{a } (a" "C{a } (Y)) = a" z" Z{a} (%'{a} ( Y )) = a'r{a)(Y). Clearly, further unfoldings do not yield further visible actions for Y, so this equation is unguarded. Indeed, both a and a. 6 are solutions for this equation, thus RSP should not be applicable. In view of this second example, we will simply consider every recursive equation in which the hiding operator 9 occurs as unguarded (unless of course we can remove the hiding operator by rewriting the system using the axioms). Now we return to the first example. We note that when we unfold X(T), we obtain X(F) without a visible action (guard) in front. We say that X
(T) depends unguarded on X(F). On the other hand, unfolding X(F) yields X(T) only behind a guard, so X(F) does not depend unguarded on X(T). We can have the same notion in a system of equations: if we replace X(T) by Y and X(F) by Z then we obtain the system {Z = T-Y, Y = a. Z} in which Z depends unguarded on Y, but Y does not depend unguarded on Z.
We conclude that 'depends unguarded on' is a binary relation R on pairs of the form (X, e), where X is a process variable and e is data of the correct type for X. R must be well-founded for the system to be guarded} ~ Rather than writing an axiomatization that tries to compute R, we let the user provide R. Then we check that R is well-founded (see also [ Axiom Sl0:(DefEq':Inttype'->Inttype')(X':ProcVar')(e':(typ' X')) ( (iPV':Inttype')(X':ProcVar')(d':(typ' X')) (TSafe' iPV' (DefEq' iPV' X' d')) )-> (RSafe (Sol ProcVar' Typ' DefEq' X' e')).
SO states that Y(f) can occur unguarded in the defining equation of X(e), provided R(X,e, Y,f) holds. 82 states that all process variables may occur after a guard; the effect is obtained by replacing g by the relation that is always true. The premiss (YSafe y) serves to check that no hiding operator occurs in y.
S l0 states that the system may refer to another system of equations. This other system must be proved safe la w.r.t, the relation that is always true, i.e. it must not contain hiding and, more importantly, it must not contain variables of the current system (technically: the defining equations Defgq' of this new system must not depend on the iPV of the current one). For example, following the notation of [BW90], we could have E = {X = a. (X' [ E~c)}, with E~c = {X' = X + b. X'}. Notice that in #CRL we cannot distinguish this combination from the flattened system {X --a. X', X' --X + b. X'}, but that we need the distinction to modularize proofs.
One can observe that the above combination of E and E~c is in fact safe, because the flattened system is. Indeed, we can allow the stronger variant of axiom Sl0 below, which allows the occurrence of those variables Y(f) that were allowed to occur unguarded anyway in the equation for X(e), because R(X,e, Y, f) holds. It does however not change R to the relation that is always true after encountering a guard. Anyway, we do not need this stronger version of Sl0 if we only build one system on top of the other, instead of mutually recursive ones.
Axiom S10:(DefEq':Inttype'->Inttype')(X':ProcVar')(e':(typ' X')) ( (iPV':Inttype')(X':
Finally, we can state the axiom RSP. Given are an interpretation of process variables iPV, the system of equations DefEq and the relation R. The system is guarded if R is well-founded and all bodies are safe (for no X and d, there is an infinite descending chain from X and d, and the body of the equation for X and d is safe). If the system is guarded and iPV is indeed a solution 12, then • equals the canonical solution (Sol ProcVar Typ DefEq) of the system. 
Fair Abstraction
As we noted before, the ABP can function correctly only if the channels do not corrupt data ad infinitum. This assumption was translated into process algebra in various ways, most notably in the form of fair abstraction rules. For an overview we refer to Section 5.6 of [BaW90]. We chose to translate CFAR b into Coq (Cluster Fair Abstraction Rule for branching bisimulation, we omit the superscript b further on). Informally, a cluster is a (maximal) set of states of a process such that each state in it can reach each other in it by taking only hidden steps. CFAR deals with all possible clusters, as opposed to KFAR,, which only deals with cycles of n states 13.
We have adapted CFAR to the presence of data as follows. Instead of a single cluster, we like to collaps a number of clusters at the same time. 12 We must put this premiss as ((X:ProcVar)(d: (typ X))<proc>(iPV X d)=(DefEq iPV X d)), rather than <Inttype>iPV=(DefEq iPV), because the latter equality does not follow from the former in Coq. 13 As the structure of c and i actions in the ABP turns out not to be a cycle, we need CFAR in our proof. Alternatively, we could hide the c actions first. Then applying T1 yields a cycle of i actions of length 2. Hiding the i actions and applying KFAR2, yields the desired result, provided that we add the axiom rl ('Cj(x) 
) = rloj(x).
tb (0) tb (1) tb (2) tb(3) t b (4) ;b (9) ~b (8) ~b (7) ~b (6) ~b (5) lb (10) Ib (11) Ib (12) I b (13) lb (14) ~b (19) ~b (18) ~b (17) ~b (16) ~b (15) ( 1(
~b (19)~b (18)~b (17)~b (16)~b (15) (4) ) ~b (9) ~b (8)~b (7)~b (6) Finally we prove by RSP X(n) = Yndivlo(nmod 10). We cannot formalize this approach in ttCRL, because there k should be a formal parameter of Y, leaving us with many clusters again. However, our translation of recursive specifications into Coq does not prevent parameterized specifications such as the one of Yk : we can encode this approach in Coq, albeit clumsily (we must add a new datatype with ten elements and a function interpreting them as 0..9). Therefore we chose a formulation of CFAR that collapses multiple clusters explicitly. First we number the different clusters. Then we number the different pairs (X,d) within each cluster, where X is a process variable and d a data parameter of the type of X. That is, we assume having the following functions.
lb(O) lb(1) lb(2)lb(3)Ib
9 cluster (X,d) gives the number of the cluster to which the pair (X,d) belongs. 9 Exit(n,m) (n,m E nat) returns the exit process of the ruth item in the nth cluster. Again it is 6 if n or m are too large.
9 a (X, d, m) is the action (including data) that leads from X(d) to the ruth item in the cluster of X(d). It is 3 if there is no such action.
In our translation into Coq, the user must provide these functions for each application of CFAR, and show that they have the following properties (let L be the set of actions going to be hidden).
For all X and d: X(d) = process(cluster(X, d), element(X, d)).
2. For all n and m: if for no X and d:
3. The system of equations can be written in the form 14
Each a(X, d, m)
is either 6, z, or its action name is in L.
All clusters are connected: we can step from X(d) to Y(e) exactly if the action a(X,d, element(Y,e)) :p 6; a cluster is connected if for all X(d) and Y(e) in it,
we can go from X(d) to Y(e) in one or more steps.
6. The system is guarded.
Given definitions satisfying these properties, CFAR concludes for all X and d:
:nat
In our example, we could use the following functions.
cluster(X,n) = ndiv 10 element(X,n) = n mod 10 process(k, m) = X(10 k + m) if m < 9,
otherwise
Exit(k,m)
= b(10k +m) ifm < 9, 6 otherwise a(X, n, m) = i if m = (n -1) rood 10, 3 otherwise.
We now provide the representation of CFAR in Coq. Notice that process needs an interpretation of process variables, and that the definition of a (X, d, m) is split in three parts: sort, action name, and data. 14 Here we see a summation over the natural numbers. Since we have only summation over sorts, we need nat as a built-in sort. Definition CheckOutside = (n,m:nat)(iPV:Inttype) (*2*) ((X:ProcVar)(d: How we use this formulation of CFAR in proving the correctness of the ABP is outlined in Section 5.4.
A Library of Lemmas
Although the axioms and rules are the most important part of the translation of/~CRL into Coq, it would be incomplete without a library of lemmas that are useful regardless of the protocol being verified. The current library is listed in Tables 4, 5, and 6; this library will grow further when more protocols are verified. We distinguish the following parts of our library.
9 Lemmas about standard data: the sorts nat and Bool, and equality. These lemmas are typically trivial, requiring only a few lines of proof. Nevertheless they are necessary to automate parts of the further proof. See Table 4 . 9 A few short lemmas about actions. See Table 4 . A large number of lemmas about the conditional operator can also be derived by a case analysis on the condition being true or false. See Note that the summations are actually shorthand for a sequence of alternative compositions. The expansion theorem cannot conveniently be translated in its full generality, i.e., with the number of components n as a parameter. Thus each version must be proved separately, with larger proofs for larger values of n. Another disadvantage is that an expansion makes many copies of the constituing components xl...x,. A different proof technique avoiding both disadvantages is being developed by Van de Pol [POS93] .
xll(yllz) = xU. (yllz) + yll (xllz) + z[[(xlly) + (y I z)L x + (x [ y)ll z + (x I z)L y xlJ(yll(zllu)) = x[~ (yH(zllu)) + y~_ (xll(zllu)) + z~. (xll(yllu)) + u[~ (xll(yllz)) +(z I u)~(xlly) + (y I z)~(xllu) + (y I u)[[ (xljz)
9 Axioms restated as rules. The axioms as they are support simplification 'inside out': for proving y.x = 6, we first rewrite y to 6 and then apply A7:
6.x = 6. Often (see Section 5.3) we would like the opposite: first apply RuleAT: y = 6 ~ y'x = 6 and then proceed proving the premiss y = 6. Proving these rules is of course trivial. See Table 6 .
The Translation of the ABP 9 sort
Apart from D, bool_Err, and Frame_Err, we must also declare a sort for D x Bool, which we obviously name Frame. Together with the built-in sorts, we get the following definitions. Definition gamma = [e,f:act] (<act>Match e with delta delta delta (<act>Match f with delta delta delta delta c delta delta delta) (<act>Match f with delta delta delta c delta delta delta delta) delta delta delta).
This definition of gamma is by case analysis. First, if e is ain, aout, int, c, delta, or tau, then (gamma e f) is delta. Second, if e is r or s, then (gamma e f) is delta unless f is s respectively r. Lemma differtypes : (T,U: types) (Differtypes T U)->'<types>T=U.
The aim of these lemmas is the following. After applying EXP4, we obtain terms containing the communication merge. After some more rewriting (see Section 5.3), we can rewrite with CF1 or CF2. The result of CF1 is a conditional, the condition being (eql Y t t' ). With the above lemmas, we built a tactical that rewrites this condition to true (by same_bool and ack) or false (by differ_frame and nack). The first three lemmas are used to put the data in a form matching the left sides of the other four. For rewriting with CF2, the premiss ~<types>T=U must be proved. As we have enumerated the datatypes by an Inductive Set, this can be done automatically by applying differtypes: when T and U are filled in, (Oiffertypes T U) beta-reduces to True (or to False, but then CF1 should be applied instead).
Apart from the lemmas mentioned in Section 3.3, which establish the necessary properties of g~,nma, we proved the following lemmas about actions. The aim of the first three lemmas is to prove that certain actions are not tau (for guardedness, see S2) and not delta (for connectedness of a cluster, see connl). The last two lemmas state that the encapsulation and hiding sets are 'good' in the sense that they do not contain tau and delta. 
Auxiliary Definitions and RSP
In this section, we translate the definitions preceding Lemma 2.3 into Coq. Then we add two more definitions necessary for the application of RSP. Finally, we show how RSP is applied by a typical example.
In Section 2.3, we defined the 'inner loops' Et and E2 of the ABP: the loops that occur when a message is corrupted in a channel. The following definitions represent the common structure of Et and E2, depicted in Fig. 3 . They are parameterized by the data sent (dl ..... dS), the types of this data, and the exit process P. In this way, we need to apply CFAR only once, on this common structure, instead of twice. 18 states in the first half of the ABP. This is by far the most time and space consuming part of the proof. In this section, we discuss in detail the tactical that performs this task without any user guidance. The tactical is specialized for the ABP, and will have to be adapted for other protocols.
It is clear that future research must concentrate on improving the linearization technique, in order to verify larger protocols. It must become much more efficient, and (almost) completely independent of the protocol. This seems ambitious at first, but for effective/~CRL-specifications [GrP94], all that is needed is an efficient encoding of term-rewriting in Coq. On the other hand, it must be investigated whether proof checkers based on term-rewriting are capable of also handling the other parts of the verification. If so, they might be better candidates than Coq for formal protocol verification. We now return to our current linearization tactical.
The possible first actions of a state of the ABP are determined by the possible first actions of the substates of the four constituing components. It turns out that the term describing such a substate can have four syntactical forms: (Sol Components ...), (seq (Sol SendSubState ...) x), (seq (Sol RecSubState ...) x) and (seq action x).
Expanding the merge yields the alternative composition of four terms (Lmer Substate l Substates ) and six terms (Liner (comm Substate l Substate2 ) Substates ). Our first step is to apply RDP on Substatel and Substate2 unless they are in the fourth syntactical form. That is, we replace a process variable (Sol ...) by its definition (DefEq (Sol ...)) only if it plays a role in determining the first possible actions. Then we unfold DefEq. DefEq occurs also as an argument of Sol, and that occurrence should not be unfolded. Therefore we replace it by a renamed copy DefEq' before (respectively during) this tactical.
For example, Unfold_Lmer_comm_Soll is the lemma The first part of the linearization tactical is the following. The first subgoal is now attempted; the second one is treated in the next iteration. The application of RuleA6' fails when we have only one alternative left. In that case, we do not need to do anything, except that the remaining tactical expects two subgoals. Thus in that case we apply True_• (P:Prop)P->True->P. In this case the second subgoal True is solved by Try Exact I, which has otherwise no effect.
If the tactical for rewriting one alternative to Delta fails, then the inner loop terminates: this alternative is not Delta, but (one of) the alternative(s) in target.
If the target contains more than one alternative, then we apply Split_alt : ~ (<proc>z=x) -> (<proc>w=y) -> (<proc>(alt z w)=(alt x y))}.
We must ensure before starting the linearization that we encounter the alternatives from the list in the correct order. If the target is (reduced to) one alternative, then we apply RuleA6 : -(<proc>Delta=x) -> (<proc>z=y) -> (<proc>z =(alt y x))}.
Next we consider the tactical for rewriting an alternative to Delta. First, we remove the sums, which are already on top. Then we take the first actions of both sides (which are by now sequences of actions) and make them into a communication (comm action action), which we try to prove equal to Delta. This concludes the tactical for rewriting an alternative to Delta. We continue by linearizing further the remaining alternatives. First, we remove the summation, if any. If the target is a summation too, then it is of the same type, and we must apply SUMll. Otherwise, we have a goal of the form c(t) 9 P = ~d:O 3n ((s(t) I  (r(d).Q(d))) Finally, we can get the first action on top by taking it outside the left-merge (which returns to a merge) and the encapsulation. We remove the first actions on both sides by an instance of the trivial rule f-equaL namely (f:proc->proc)(x,y:proc)(<proc>x=y)->(<proc>(f x)=(f y)), where f is (seq action). SC7 restores the expected association of the merges.
If RuleSUMrep is used as mentioned above, it changes the proof obligation to (C(t)'P)<eqD(t, d)>6 = 3n((S(t) I (r(d). Q(d)
Try Elim CM3; Try Elim D4; Try (Rewrite Dl;[IdtaclAuto]); Repeat Apply (f_equal proc proc); Repeat Elim SCT.
Applying CFAR
We apply CFAR on the general loop depicted in Fig. 3 , and assume declarations of T1 ..... T4 and dl,...,d5 accordingly. This loop consists of one cluster of seven elements, Xl ..... XT, all of type one. Thus we must define the following functions. In Coq, we and m < 7, 6 otherwise and m = 1, ~ otherwise 6 otherwise 6 otherwise 6 otherwise 6 otherwise 6 otherwise 6 otherwise 6 otherwise.
define element through the Match-function. We cannot do that for process and Exit, because nat is not inductively defined. The problem is circumvented by making extensive use of the conditional construct. For example, Exit is defined as 2 k,m : nat (i. P < eqnat(n, 1) ~ 6) < eqnat(k,O) t> 3.
The definition of process contains eight conditionals! As we noted in Section 3.7, the function a must be split in three parts in Coq: sort, action name, and data. Because <proc> (• D delta d)=Delga for all sorts D and data d, we can define sort and data independent of m: In contrast, the function a giving the action name depends on both the process variable and m. Here it is really a problem that nat is not inductively defined. If it were, we could define a by two nested Matches. As it is, we found no other way than writing an axiom am for each m (0 < m < 7) and one axiom a7 for m > 7.
Parameter a : PVLoop->one->nat->act.
Axiom aO: (X:PVLoop) <act>(<act>Match X with delta delta delta delta delta c c)=(a X i 0). Axiom al: (X:PVLoop) <act>(<act>Match X with c delta delta delta delta delta delta)=(a X i (S 0)).
Axiom a7: (n:nat)(X:PVLoop) <act>delta=(a X i (S (S (S (S (S (S (S n)))))))).
Our aim is to prove the following goal. (Sol PVLoop TypLoop (DefEqLoop T1 T2 T3 T4 dl d2 d3 d4 d5 P) X1 i))) =(seq Tau (hide Hiding P)).
The assumption that P is safe is necessary for proving that the cluster is guarded 9 It will be trivial to verify it for Exit1 and Exit2 later.
Before we can apply CFAR, we must bring the exit process in the correct form, that is, we must prove z. zr(P) = z" Tl(~-~,:,~t Exit (O, n) ). This is rather easy:
because there is only one exit i. P for n = 1, we can apply SUMmand with d' = 1 and manipulate the conditionals to prove that the remaining sum is 6. Then we take the hiding inside to hide the action i.
We can now apply CFAR:
Apply (CFAR PVLoop TypLoop (DefEqLoop T1 T2 T3 T4 dl d2 d3 d4 d5 P) RLoop Hiding cluster element process Exit D' a d' Xl i).
The prerequisites CheckInside and Check0utside are relatively easy to verify, although the large number of conditionals in process makes the proofs somewhat cumbersome 9 Verifying CheckDef is even more cumbersome: for each i, we must simplify ~,:nat a (Xi, i, n) .process (O, n) . For most values of n, a (Xi, i, n) is 6. We use SUMmand to isolate the useful value(s) of n, and rewrite the remaining sum to 6. Instead of induction on n, we apply the lemma 
<nat>n=(S (S (S (S (S (S 0)))))) \/ <nat>Ex([m:nat] <nat>n=(S (S (S (S (S (S (S m)))))))).
The same lemma is used to prove Checka, which is otherwise trivial 9 CheckConn states that each state must be reachable from each other state within the cluster. In order to avoid double induction, we apply transitivity first, and prove that each state is reachable from Xl, and vice versa. This part of the proof is implemented by 'walking forward' through the loop. Finally, proving guardedness was already discussed in Section 5.2. In the ABE we need CFAR only once, and on a loop of only seven states. We conclude that the current definitions are good enough in this situation. But it is clear that for larger loops, and for protocols that require multiple applications of CFAR, more sophisticated proof techniques are necessary, in particular for CheckDef and CheckConn. Improved techniques for linearization will probably apply to CheckDef also. For CheckConn, an existing efficient algorithm for checking that a graph is strongly connected must be translated to Coq. Here we see a reversal of the programs-as-proofs paradigm: instead of extracting a program from a proof, we want to translate an existing program (and its verification) to a proof generator.
Completing the Proof
We define the process BufferTwice as the process that satisfies the final equation in the proof of Theorem 2.4, namely the defining equation of a buffer unfolded twice.
